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
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A Battalion XO's Notes on Successful Logistical Operations at the JRTC
by Major Patrick J. Sweeney,* 4th Bn, 11th FA, Ft. Wainwright, AK

Battles are won or lost during the preparation phase. This is especially true from a logistical standpoint. According to **FM 100-5,** *Operations,* the characteristics that lead to effective logistical operations include: anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation.

● **A logistics plan gains anticipation through detailed estimates that accurately predict future logistic needs.**

● **The logistic plan is developed at the same time as the operational plan to achieve integration.** Thus, during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), logisticians can provide accurate information on the logistical capabilities of the unit to ensure that all courses of action (COAs) developed are supportable from a logistic standpoint. This also ensures that the logistical priorities are synchronized with the operational priorities.

● **Continuity is obtained by developing a logistical plan stressing continuous support throughout the entire operation.** Logistical planners must incorporate measures into the plan to ensure that the flow of critical supplies is not disrupted before, during, or after the operation.

● **A logistical plan is responsive if it can rapidly react to a changing situation.**

● **Finally, improvisation is obtained through the creative use of on-hand resources to overcome obstacles and accomplish the mission.**

*Contributing Authors: MAJ Glen Harp, FA O/C, JRTC, and LTC Larry Saul, Cdr, 4th Battalion, 11th FA.

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TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

This article outlines four techniques that the 4th Battalion, 11th Field Artillery, used at JRTC to develop effective logistical plans that incorporate all the logistics characteristics outlined in **FM 100-5,** *Operations.* These four techniques were: the push-package concept of logistics, planned redundancy in storage and transportation of supplies, "forward-thinking" ammunition management, and planning for contingencies during an operation.

PUSH-PACKAGE LOGISTICS

During the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) phase of the JRTC rotation, the logistic planners developed a basic package of supplies to push to the firing batteries daily. The intent of the logistic planners was to anticipate the firing batteries' daily needs and have the supplies delivered to the users before the need arose. Furthermore, the daily push package allowed firing batteries to build a small reserve of supplies, in case lines of communication (LOCs) were disrupted by enemy activity.

The basic push package of supplies that a firing battery received daily consisted of:

- ✔ **Class I - Rations for two days out and water for the next 24 hours (M149 exchange).**
- ✔ **Class III - 40 gallons (in 5-gallon cans) of fuel for vehicles/generators.**
- ✔ **Class V- at least 170 rounds of HE and ICM.**
- ✔ **Class IX - as needed.**

The daily push-package design was based on the logistic estimate and the prior experience of the logisticians. One major concern for the logistic planners was keeping firing batteries resupplied with water. The September temperatures at JRTC made the resupply of water an extremely high priority. Water resupply was accomplished using a M149 water trailer exchange system. Prior to the scheduled logistic package (LOGPAC) operation, firing batteries topped off all water cans from the M149. The support platoon exchanged a full M149 with the empty one during the LOGPAC operation. Usually the full M149 trailers were also packed with ice to provide cold drinking water. This extra effort to place ice in the water trailers had a great impact on the soldiers' morale.

Resupply of ammunition was also a concern. The firing batteries entered Cortina with each howitzer section carrying 22 complete rounds and a 5-ton truck carrying 170 rounds. The daily push of ammunition maintained the amount of Class V in the firing batteries around the level of what they could carry with organic assets. The additional surplus provided the firing batteries with a buffer in case some of their ammunition was lost to enemy activity or resupply was slowed due to enemy action on the LOCs.

Thus, the use of the push-package concept of logistics allowed the logistic planners to anticipate and meet future supply requirements. It enabled them to ensure continuity of supply by building a small reserve of supplies for the firing batteries to draw from when enemy activity disrupted the normal LOGPAC. Lastly, it provided responsiveness through the proactive delivery of supplies and by the storage of a small reserve in the batteries from which to draw in the event of unforeseen events.

PLANNED REDUNDANCY

Planned redundancy is another technique that helps build an effective logistic resupply operation. For critical classes of supply, logisticians must develop multiple sites to store and plan multiple means to transport them. For instance, for Class V ammunition, FA logistic planners should have one day of supply (DOS) of ammunition at each firing battery, one DOS at the ALOC, and two DOS at the support battalion's ammunition storage point (ASP). Note that a light support battalion is manned to run an ammunition transfer point (ATP). However, because of the large amounts of ammunition flowing into theater to support the brigade, the battalion will need to establish an ASP adjacent to the air head. Thus, if the enemy destroys the ammunition at one location, the battalion has the flexibility to draw from the others to make up the loss.

Having multiple storage locations for critical supplies reduces the risk presented by catastrophic loss and protects the planned flow of logistics. Their use alleviates the need for emergency resupply, thus ensuring continuity of sustainment. In addition, logistic planners must plan multiple means to transport priority supplies. For example, if the primary means of transporting critical supplies for the day is by ground LOGPAC, then the logisticians should coordinate aerial delivery as a backup. At JRTC, the enemy interdicts the ground LOCs numerous times throughout the rotation, thus the backup air transportation means is critical to ensure the firing batteries receive essential supplies in a timely manner.

As such, planned redundancy in logistic operations ensures continuity of support and also enhances a unit's ability to logistically respond to unforeseen circumstances.

"FORWARD-THINKING" AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT

Ammunition is the essential class of supply that has a direct impact on the ability of the FA battalion and maneuver brigade to accomplish their mission. Thus, the management of ammunition is a critical task for FA battalion logisticians, operational planners, and fire supporters. The three key players in the management of ammunition in an FA battalion are the Bde FSO, S-3 and Bn XO:

● **The Bde FSO identifies requirements for upcoming and future operations.**
● **The S-3 tracks ammunition status, controls its distribution, and forecasts requirements for 24-36 hours into the fight.**
● **The Bn XO identifies sources of supply, supervises the planning and coordination of resupply operations, monitors consumption, and anticipates future requirements.**

These three key players must talk frequently to share information about all future requirements for, or changes in, the supply of ammunition. Diligent tracking of ammunition and sharing of information ensures that the necessary ammunition is in theater, distributed, and used to support the maneuver commander's plan.

Ammunition management, for FA logisticians, begins prior to deployment from the home station. One of the biggest challenges logistic planners must overcome is planning the movement of the battalion's basic load of ammunition into Cortina.

Prior to deployment, the Bn Cdr, Bn XO, S-3, Bde FSO, S-4, and S-2 must meet to develop ammunition requirements (numbers, type of round, and fuzes), based on current intelligence, for the first 10 days of the operation in Cortina. Logistical planners use the information from this meeting to design the airflow of the ammunition into theater and develop ammunition package menus (see Figures 1 to 3). The airflow matrix is developed in coordination with the forward support battalion's support operations officer. The support operations officer allocates to the artillery battalion a number of combat off-load pallets and Containerized Delivery System (CDS) bundles for planning purposes. Artillery logistical planners should design the airflow so that all of the battalion's basic load of ammunition is in Cortina by Day 7 of the operation. This allows the ALOC personnel time to distribute the ammunition to the firing units prior to Day 10.

The menu of ammunition packages provides flexibility to operation and logistic planners by allowing changes to the type and amount of ammunition flowing into theater. The menu should have packages, built-on 463L pallets, for offense, defense, and special munitions (smoke, illumination, CH8, or RAP) (see Figure 2). This allows the S-3 to adjust the type of ammunition flowing into theater, based on the current fight and projected situation, 24 to 48 hours in the future. Likewise, logistic planners must develop a menu for CDS bundles. CDS bundles are excellent for transporting supplies, particularly single-type loads of ammunition (see Figure 3).

These menus of ammunition packages allow responsiveness in adjusting supplies to meet the current situation as well as anticipation of future needs. In addition, the ammunition menus and airflow matrix provide integration to the logistical plan because they are developed jointly by the operation and logistic planners and because the operators (S-3) can control, to some extent, the flow of supplies for future operations.

Figure 1: Ammunition Airflow Schedule

Day of Operation	Combat Off-Load Pallets	CDS Bundles	No. Rounds
D-day	1 Off, 1 Def	1WP	326
D+1	2 Off, 1 Def	1WP, 1 CH8	504
D+2	2 Off, 1 Def	1WP, 1 Illum	504
D+3	2 Off, 1 Def	1WP, 9 HE	812
D+4	No Air Available		
D+5	3 Def	9HE, 1HC	812
D+6	2 Special No. 1	4HE	440
D+7	2 Special No. 2	4 ICM	432

Note 1: **Coordinate airflow and ammunition storage requirements with the support battalion.**

Note 2: **Plan to have all ammunition in Cortina by D+7.**

Note 3: **A 463L pallet holds 144 (105 MM) rounds w/fuzes.**

Note 4: **An A-22 bag holds 38 (105 MM) rounds w/fuzes.**

Figure 2: Combat Off-Load Menu (463L Pallets)

Type	DODAC	Offense Package	Defense Package	Special 1 (Deep)	Special 2 (Killer)
HE	C445	48	24		72
ILL	C449	0	0		
HC SMK	C452	36	0		
WP	C454	0	0		
ICM	C462	0	36		72
RAP	C546	48	24	60	
HE-CH8	C473	12	36	84	
APERS	C513	0	12		
HEP-T	C448	0	12		
	Total	144	144	144	144

Note: **A 463L pallet holds 144 rounds (105MM).**

Figure 3: Containerized Delivery System (CDS) Bundle Menu

Type	DODAC	No. Bundles	No. Rounds
HE	C445	26	988
ILL	C449	2	72
HC SMK	C452	2	72
WP	C454	4	152
ICM	C462	4	152
RAP	C546	2	72
HE-CH8	C473	1	38
APERS	C513	0	0
HEP-T	C448	0	0

Note: A-22 bag holds 38 rounds of 105MM plus fuzes.

Prior to deploying to Cortina, the Cdr and XO should consider consolidating battery ammunition sections into a battalion support platoon. The battalion's centralized control of ammunition hauling assets is critical for successful ammunition management in Cortina.

● **Centralized control of battery ammunition sections provides the ALOC with the assets it needs to move the Class V and all other classes of supply.**
● **Conducting centralized LOGPACs cuts down on the probability of losing critical hauling assets by limiting the amount of time they spend on the road and providing more protection for critical assets.**
● **Centralized control of the ammunition-hauling assets provides the logistic leaders with the flexibility to respond to equipment losses quickly and efficiently.**

Thus, task-organizing the battery ammunition sections into one platoon provides artillery logisticians with the assets to ensure continuity of support and responsiveness to meet the demands of a dynamic battlefield.

Drawing the ammunition, which the battalion and organic assets will use as they move into Cortina, is the next step in proactive ammunition management. An early ammunition draw provides the battalion with the flexibility to draw what it can carry with organic assets and move the rest to aerial delivery branch (ADB) to be rigged for air movement into Cortina. As such, the artillery battalion S-4 needs to make an appointment to draw this ammunition from the North Ft. Polk simulated ammunition supply point (ASP) as soon as possible after arriving in the ISB.

For planning purposes, each firing battery can carry 472 rounds with organic assets. These figures are based on each howitzer section carrying 22 rounds (6 X 22 = 132 rounds) and each ammunition 5-ton truck carrying 170 rounds (2 X 170 = 340), for a total of 472. The two ammunition 5-tons will accompany the battery for the movement into Cortina only. The support platoon will have an additional ammunition 5-ton from each firing battery during its move into Cortina. The consolidated support platoon will draw the ammunition and transport it to the ISB.

When moving the artillery battalion into the country of Cortina, a unit should push most of the ammunition forward with the firing batteries. Each battery should have two ammunition 5-tons (170 rounds x 2 = 340 rounds) attached for this operation. Placing the two ammunition 5-tons with the firing batteries for the movement operation ensures that each unit has at least two DOS of Class V on hand, in the event the movement of the support platoon into country is disrupted. Spreading out the ammunition across each element moving into Cortina reduces the risk of catastrophic loss of the basic load, which enhances continuity of support. In addition, pushing ammunition forward provides the logistic planners a day or two to move into country and establish the logistical base before having to execute a LOGPAC to resupply Class V. Therefore, the artillery logisticians do not have the urgent need to launch a

LOGPAC for ammunition resupply on main supply routes (MSRs) that have not been fully cleared or secured. The extra day or two provides the maneuver forces time to clear and secure the main MSRs before the artillery battalion commences its LOGPAC operations. The support platoon moves the empty ammunition 5-tons from each firing battery and returns them to the ALOC on the first LOGPAC. One 5-ton from the support platoon remains at each firing battery to provide the battery with the haul and storage capability for 170 rounds. Thus, during LOGPACs, ammunition 5-tons are exchanged on a one-for-one basis.

Once in the country, the Bde FSO and the S-3 must talk on a routine basis to determine the ammunition requirements for the upcoming 24 to 36 hours. The S-3 provides the Bn XO and ALOC planners with the future ammunition requirements and anticipated movements of elements prior to the nightly logistic synchronization meeting. This allows the logistic planners time to finalize the plan for the next day's LOGPAC and make adjustments to the airflow matrix for the next 24 to 36 hours. Furthermore, the Bn XO and S-3 have the flexibility to modify the ammunition resupply airflow schedule, in terms of the amount and type of pallets or CDS bundles, pre-programmed to flow into theater (see Figures 1 to 3). For instance, if new intelligence indicates the task force will conduct offensive operations in the next two days, the logisticians can coordinate with the support battalion to have only offense pallets or CDS bundles flown in on the next two days. Or, if the S-3 foresees the need for shooting long-range ammunition in the next 24 to 36 hours, the ALOC planners can have CH8 and RAP CDS bundles flow into theater. Thus, the S-3's daily 24- to 36-hour ammunition forecasts drive the airflow of ammunition into theater. The routine talk between the Bn XO, S-3, and Bde FSO is critical for effective and efficient ammunition management in country. As noted earlier, the pre-programming of air movement of ammunition and the ammunition selection menus provides the artillery operators and logisticians with responsiveness, integration of the logistical plan with the operational plan, and flexibility to react to changing situations.

PLANNED CONTINGENCIES

Planning for unforeseen situations during an operation ensures that logisticians build anticipation, responsiveness, and improvisation into their logistic resupply plans. Logisticians must plan for two contingency missions during an operation: emergency resupply of ammunition, and nonstandard casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). In the field artillery support plan (FASP), a decision point must be established for launching the emergency Class V resupply mission and the composition and amount of ammunition to be delivered. The primary means of transportation for this mission should be ground convoy. The artillery battalion has direct control of the assets. Air assets are scarce and too many outside factors can impact on their availability, such as weather or priorities to the infantry line units. Prior to the start of the operation, ammunition trucks are loaded, convoy routes are cleared for use, convoy orders are given, rehearsals are conducted, and the vehicles and personnel are marshalled. If the decision point is reached, then the ALOC battle captains coordinate with the support battalion TOC and the DS battalion TOC to receive a current status of route and permission to move on the pre-cleared route. A redundant means for delivering the emergency Class V resupply is by air. The support platoon can pre-rig the ammunition on a secure PZ to take advantage of any air asset that becomes available. Likewise, the PZ operation is rehearsed and the PZ control party is standing by waiting for the mission. Prior to launching the ground emergency resupply operation, the ALOC battle captain coordinates with the support operations officer to determine if air is available to move the ammunition.

To prepare for nonstandard CASEVAC, the ALOC planners need to have several trucks downloaded, rigged to carry litters, and prepositioned. The battalion's mess trucks can provide the additional haul capacity to handle this mission, thus leaving the support platoon to concentrate on Class V resupply operations. Similarly, prior to the start of operations, the ALOC battle captains ensure that the convoy order is issued, rehearsals are conducted, routes are coordinated, and vehicles and personnel are marshalled. The nonstandard CASEVAC 5-ton trucks are marshalled at the battalion aid station (BAS) or in the ALOC. The ALOC battle captain will give the order to launch the nonstandard

CASEVAC if a firing battery or element receives more casualties than can be evacuated with organic assets. First, he notifies support operations that the unit has a mass casualty situation and requests assistance. If the support battalion cannot provide ground or air transportation, then the battle captain prepares to launch the nonstandard CASEVAC with organic assets. Before launching the mission, the battle captain clears the mission through the support battalion TOC and the DS battalion TOC. In addition, he acquires the most current status on the route and enemy situation. The battle captain briefs the mission commander prior to departure.

Planning and preparing for contingencies during the operation, such as emergency ammunition resupply and nonstandard CASEVAC, provide the artillery logisticians a support plan with responsiveness and continuity. In addition, the support plan provides the battalion with the means to maintain the initiative and freedom of action to execute the FASP. Furthermore, the use of the battalion's mess trucks to provide nonstandard CASEVAC incorporates improvisation into the logistical plan. These planned contingencies help ensure that the battalion is sustained during the critical points in the operation by anticipating the unforeseen.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the four techniques of **push-package logistics, planned redundancy, forward-thinking ammunition management, and planned contingencies** will help artillery logisticians develop successful logistical support plans at the JRTC. These techniques ensure that the characteristics of **anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation** are imbedded in the logistical support plan. This leads to effective sustainment in a combat environment. The keys to effective logistical operations are **planning early, thinking and executing logistical support for 24 to 36 hours into the future, and always having redundant sources of supply and the means to transport them.** Effective logistical plans sustain the force in the current operation, even during changing situations, and continue to set the conditions for logistical success on the battlefield in the next 24 to 36 hours. This prevents the enemy's current actions from diverting logistical resources that are preparing for tomorrow and the day after tomorrow's operations. Thus, an effective logistic plan provides commanders with the flexibility to adapt to changes in today's fight and enhances their ability to execute tomorrow's operations. ***On Time!***✪

Charting the Course:
The ARNG FA Battery Commander's Guide to Developing
a Short-Range Training Plan
by MAJ David G. Johnson and CPT Christopher J. Bonheim, NG, FA, O/C Trainers

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"Training is the cornerstone of readiness--it is the top priority for the total Army."[1]

Battalion Commander: Commanders, we are four months out from briefing the State Adjutant General on next year's training plan. All of you have received a rough draft of my training guidance and the battalion short-range training calendar for next year. I want each of you to submit your battery's short-range training plan for next year to the battalion S3 at the next month's drill. During this drill, I want you to brief me on your short-range training plan and your current assessment of your battery's combat readiness.

Battery Commanders: Yes sir!

What happens next? After leaving the old man's office with a giant dose of reality stuck in your throat, you come to the conclusion that developing and briefing this short-range training plan (12 months) is no walk in the park. The first step most battery commanders (BCs) do is call the first sergeant (1SG) into the office and tell him to gather up the platoon leaders (PLs), platoon sergeants (PSGs) and gunnery sergeants (GSGs). The next step is where the majority of BCs take a nosedive. You instruct the PLs and PSGs to give you their training plan for next year's short-range training plan.

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[1] General Carl E. Vuono.

This article provides the National Guard BC a guide in assisting him in developing his short-range training plan. This article addresses five steps to aid the BC in developing this plan. **Step one** takes a look at the BC's role in training. **Step two** covers the tools required to complete the training plan. **Step three** addresses the assessment process. **Step four** ties the previous three steps together to formulate the battery short-range training plan. **Step five** is the execution of the short-range training plan.

STEP ONE: The BC's Role in Training.

Before you get started in developing the short-range training plan, review the role of the BC in the training process. ***Battle-Focused Training*, FM 25-101,** is the Army's current doctrine on the development and execution of training. It states that commanders are responsible for ***training one level*** down and ***evaluating two levels*** down. For example, the firing battery commander trains his platoon leaders and evaluates his Howitzer section chiefs. The following checklist, although not all inclusive, lists the BC's responsibilities in planning and conducting training:

❏ **Develop and communicate your intent.**
❏ **Train the trainer.**
❏ **Establish the standards of performance.**
❏ **Promote a positive command climate.**
❏ **Be personally involved.**
❏ **State your objectives for success for all Inactive Duty Training (IDT) days and Annual Training (AT).**
❏ **Protect the battery from training distracters.**
❏ **Ensure all leaders attend training meetings.**
❏ **Protect training resources.**
❏ **Observe and assess training execution.**
❏ **Observe and assess your junior leaders.**

Before we continue, it is important that you can answer the following three questions. First, what are the nine principles of training, and what purpose do they serve? Second, what does Battle Focus mean, and what impact does Battle Focus have on planning training? Finally, how does the battery Mission-Essential Task List (METL) impact on the development of the short-range training plan?

❶ The nine principles of training are the corner stones of any effective training plan. The principles serve as a guide for BCs to follow during the development of the short-range training plan.

❏ **Train as a combined arms and services team.** This is difficult to execute during IDTs, but it is very possible during AT.
❏ **Train as you fight.** Ensure training conditions are realistic and near wartime conditions. This means that training is always to standard, tactically oriented and safe.
❏ **Use appropriate doctrine.** Ensure training involves the correct procedures and principles. Leaders and soldiers must understand the doctrinal standards before any execution.
❏ **Use performance-oriented training.** The most effective way to train is through hands-on training. Leaders and soldiers achieve better results when they know the tasks, conditions, and standards and can execute those tasks outside the classroom.
❏ **Train to challenge.** Design training so that it challenges and tests the soldier's ability and will to succeed.
❏ **Train to sustain proficiency.** Sustainment training builds on skills already mastered. This type of training is done through opportunity training or hip-pocket training.
❏ **Train using multiechelon techniques.** This is concurrent training on different tasks by your platoons or sections, for example, you determine that your battery's next IDT will focus on occupation of a firing position. First platoon will focus on advance party responsibilities prior to occupying and second platoon will concentrate on achieving ready-to-fire time (RTF).

❑ **Train to maintain.** The short-range training plan must include your maintenance plan for the year. This includes preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) schedule, equipment service schedule and command maintenance program.

❑ **Make commanders (leaders) the primary trainers.** Leaders at all levels share the responsibility of training and developing junior leaders. The short-range plan should include a leader development plan that meets the needs of the unit and develops platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, section chiefs and sections. A few examples of leader development programs include MOSQ courses, officer professional development (OPD) classes and noncommissioned officer development (NCOPD) classes, and METL-based training.

❷ Battle focus is a concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions.[2] What purpose does battle focus have on planning training? First, it allows the BC to identify those tasks (i.e., collective and individual tasks) to train on to accomplish the battery's wartime mission. Second, it enables the BC to develop his training plan to include those leadership competencies required to execute the Army's warfighting doctrine. **Key point to remember: The 1SG and NCO leadership select individual tasks that support each collective task**.

❸ What purpose does the METL have in developing the short-range training plan? The METL is based on the wartime mission; it is a list of tasks required to accomplish the battery's wartime mission. The METL serves as a guide to reduce the required training tasks to an achievable number. The battery METL is developed after:

❑ Analyzing the battalion's mission and METL and identifying the specified and implied tasks associated with your battery.

❑ Determining and selecting the tasks critical for the battery wartime mission accomplishment. These tasks come from the Mission Training Plan (MTP).

STEP TWO: Gather The Tools Needed to Complete the Training Plan.

Now that you understand the BC's role in the training process, it is time to gather all the tools needed to assist you in assessing your battery's strengths and weaknesses. The following are the minimum required tools needed to get you moving in the right direction.

❑ **Brigade's wartime mission guidance** *(2 levels up)*.
❑ **Battalion's wartime mission guidance.**
❑ **Brigade's mission statement and METL** *(2 levels up)*.
❑ **Battalion's wartime mission statement and METL.**
❑ **Battalion Commander's Battle Tasks.**
❑ **Your mission statement.**
❑ **Your Battery METL.**
❑ **FORSCOM Form 1049R,** *Training Assessment Model (TAM).*
❑ **Results from most recent AT/IDT exercise (i.e., take-home package or lane book).**
❑ **Collective tasks list (MTP) that support your METL.**
❑ **Leader and soldier tasks that support your METL.**
❑ **Pre- and Post-mobilization training plan with supporting collective tasks broken down by** Category I, II, and III (*see Encl 1: Recommended Category I, II and III Tasks for Army National Guard Field Artillery Battery Commanders*).

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[2] FM 25-101.

- ❏ **Battalion Commander's training guidance and objectives.**
- ❏ **Battalion's yearly training calendar.**
- ❏ **Mobilization plans.**
- ❏ **Annual common task testing (CTT).**
- ❏ **Fifth Army's "Prescription for Success" initiative (Category I, II, and III tasks).**
- ❏ **Battalion's time management plan (Green-Amber-Red cycle).**
- ❏ **The appropriate references** *(see Encl 2: Useful References for Army National Guard Field Artillery Battery Commanders).*

STEP THREE: The Assessment Process.

The assessment starts your planning process. FM 25-101 states that the commander's assessment determines a *strategy* to improve training proficiency on specific weaknesses and plan sustainment training on demonstrated strengths. Your assessment links the evaluation of training executed (i.e., AT and IDT exercises) to the planning of upcoming training. The training strategy is a product of your battery's assessment. Your assessment is:

- ❏ **Based on all training (IDT and AT).**
- ❏ **Developed using the take-home package or lane book and the TAM.**
- ❏ **Required for each METL task with supporting collective tasks and leader/individual tasks.**
- ❏ **A snapshot of the your battery's current soldier, leader, and collective task proficiency.**

STEP FOUR: The Planning Process.

You're almost finished! Step three, the assessment process, gave you a training strategy to steer you in the right direction. Now it is time to put your training strategy on paper. This training strategy is your plan to accomplish your battery's goals and objectives for the next 12 months. Your training strategy should accomplish the following:

- ❏ **Focus on your METL.**
- ❏ **Incorporate the combined arms team.**
- ❏ **State *who, what, when,* and *where* to train.**
- ❏ **Lay out a logical sequence to execute training.**
- ❏ **Determine the type of training exercise to be used.**
- ❏ **Determine the frequencies for a given task to train.**
- ❏ **Coordinate all training events.**
- ❏ **Determine required resources.**
- ❏ **Provide you with your training guidance.**

Now it is time to develop the short-range training plan. FM 25-101 states that the short-range training plan is a refinement of the battalion's long-range calendar. The short-range training plan breaks down the long-range plan into more detailed training events and activities. The short-range training plan along with a calendar is published three to four months prior to the start of the fiscal year.

Time management is the key to developing a successful short-range training plan. The active component (AC) uses the Green-Amber-Red time management system, but this system does not adapt well with the National Guard's training cycle. The time management system is determined by the battalion's long-range planning calendar. You should implement your time management system in conjunction with the battalion's system. Focus your time management system *two levels down* to the section level to improve and sustain METL proficiency throughout the training year.

We recommend that the National Guard battery commander use the following steps when completing his short-range training plan: ***schedule required training events, schedule other requirements and schedule unit-controlled exercises and other training.***

❶ *Schedule required training events* (**Battalion-directed**).

❏ **AT dates.**
❏ **IDT dates.**
❏ **Holidays.**
❏ **State requirements (i.e., Mobilization/Readiness Assistance, Civil Disturbance Training and Maintenance Inspections).**
❏ **Federal requirements.**
❏ **Gunnery sustainment training.**
❏ **Leader's safety certification.**
❏ **Section certification.**
❏ **Weapons qualification.**
❏ **Training assistance visits (TAVs) from Training Support Battalion (TSBn).**
❏ **Leaders teaches from TSBn (i.e., lane training as per TC 25-10).**
❏ **New equipment training (NET).**

❷ *Schedule other requirements* (**These requirements are next in priority that have an impact on training**).

❏ **Inspections.**
❏ **OPD.**
❏ **NCOPD.**
❏ **MOSQ.**
❏ **Army physical fitness test (APFT).**
❏ **CTT.**
❏ **Maintenance and recovery.**
❏ **Community support events (i.e., Veterans' Parade).**
❏ **Social functions (i.e., military formals and holiday functions).**

❸ *Schedule unit-controlled exercises and other training (Training which will improve or sustain METL proficiency).*

❏ **Inventories.**
❏ **Training meetings.**
❏ **Tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs) classes.**
❏ **Collective and individual tasks (MTP) classes.**
❏ **Leader training (Aiming Circle drills).**
❏ **Section training and certification (crew drills).**
❏ **Driver's training and testing.**
❏ **Opportunity training.**

STEP FIVE: The Execution Process.

You're almost finished! Now ask yourself, "Does this training plan pass the common-sense test and does it meet my training goals and objectives." As the commander, you must tie in all the training events into a sequential plan using the *crawl*, *walk*, **and** *run* philosophy. The following checklist will aid you in staying on track prior to, and during, the execution of your training plan.

- ❏ **Is the training plan Battle-Focused?**
- ❏ **Is the training plan METL-driven?**
- ❏ **Does it incorporate the MTP's TE&Os?**
- ❏ **Are collective tasks identified early on in the training cycle? (See Enclosure 1.)**
- ❏ **Are collective tasks broken down by month and tied into your IDTs? (Days, Hours, Minutes-- remember: train to standard, not to time).**
- ❏ **Are your individual tasks prioritized? (1SGs' and NCOs' responsibility.)**
- ❏ **Are sections trained prior to platoon and battery operations?**
- ❏ **Are systems in place to provide on-going assessments of soldier, leader and unit performance?**
- ❏ **Are you updating your 1049R Form after each training event?**
- ❏ **Do all leaders understand the collective tasks?**
- ❏ **Do you have a current TACSOP within your battery?**
- ❏ **Do you have training meetings planned?**
- ❏ **Do you have pre-execution checks established?**
- ❏ **Do you have pre-combat checks (PCCs) established?**
- ❏ **Do you have time scheduled to repeat tasks not performed to standard?**
- ❏ **Do you have time scheduled for leaders to prepare and rehearse their training?**
- ❏ **Do you have a solid safety program that enforces the standard?**
- ❏ **Are you using a time management system (green-amber-red) within the battery to protect your battery, platoon and sections' training?**
- ❏ **Do you have the necessary resources required for training?**
- ❏ **Are AGR personnel being utilized (i.e., sustainment training and preparation and recovery for FTXs)?**

Planning your battery training is not an easy task. As the commander, you have to take charge, be innovative and ruthless with your 39 days of training. You have to plan, prioritize, focus, execute and assess all training. You must have a backup plan and accept nothing less then the standard. You are the standard bearer, and you create the environment that fosters successful training.✪

ENCLOSURE 1

Recommended Category I, II, and III Tasks for Army NG FA Battery Commanders (*Paladin-specific, Towed-specific*)

The supporting collective tasks are categorized as one, two and three.

Category I tasks are those the commander deems essential to accomplishing his wartime mission. He intends to achieve a trained (**"T"**) level during pre-mobilization training for these tasks.

Category II tasks are those in which the unit, because of time available during pre-mobilization, probably cannot achieve a **"T"** level. The commander intends to train these tasks to a needs practice (**"P"**) level during pre-mobilization with a quick attainment of a **"T"** level at post-mobilization.

Category III tasks are those tasks deferred to post-mobilization. The commander intends to accept a untrained (**"U"**) level during pre-mobilization with an attainment of a **"T"** level during post-mobilization. This **"T"** level attainment is dependent on the time available during post-mobilization.

Category I Tasks:

❏ **Conduct Tactical Move**	6-5-42000
❏ **Conduct Occupation of Position Area**	6-3-42300 (Non-Paladin)
❏ **Establish and Maintain FDC**	6-3-22000
❏ **Determine Firing Data**	6-3-22001
❏ **Prepare Howitzer for the Conduct-of-Fire Missions**	6-3-22302 (Non-Paladin)
❏ **Conduct Fire Missions**	6-3-22002
❏ **Manage and Submit Records and Reports**	6-3-22003
❏ **Direct and Control Battery/Platoon Occupation and Establishment of Firing Capabilities**	6-3-22010
❏ **Perform Reconnaissance Operations**	6-7-12300/*6-7-13200*
❏ **Perform Maintenance Operations**	6-0-21009
❏ **Conduct Pre/Deployment Operations**	6-8-41000
❏ *Establish Firing Capability at Firing Position*	*6-3-43200*
❏ *Perform a Survivability Move*	*6-7-23200*
❏ *Conduct Emergency Fire Mission*	*6-3-22011*

Category II Tasks:

❏ **Perform Risk Management Procedures**	71-3-R231
❏ **Establish and Maintain Communications**	6-0-21000
❏ **Command and Control Battery/Platoon Movement Operations**	6-5-22306 (Non-Paladin)
❏ **Plan and Coordinate Defense and Security of the Battery/Platoon Area**	6-0-21007
❏ *Establish and Maintain a Battery/Platoon Operations Center*	**6-3-22009**
❏ **Direct and Coordinate Delivery of Fires**	6-3-21010
❏ **Direct and Control Firing Battery/Platoon Operations**	6-3-22010
❏ **Occupy a Tactical Assembly Area**	6-8-41001
❏ **Defend and Secure Battery/Platoon Area and Material**	6-0-21004
❏ **Maintain Communications Equipment**	6-0-21003

Category III Tasks:

❏ **Conduct Emergency Fire Mission**	6-3-22011
❏ **Perform Hasty Survey**	6-3-22307
❏ **Conduct a Field Artillery Raid**	6-3-41000
❏ **Store and Transport Ammunition**	6-3-22003
❏ **Unload the Howitzer**	6-3-22005
❏ **Establish a Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System Frequency Hopping Net**	11-5-1102
❏ **Control and Use COMSEC Material**	6-0-21002
❏ **Take small arms air defense measures against aerial platforms (rotary-wing, fixed-wing, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles)**	44-2-C221
❏ **Establish and Maintain a Battery/Platoon Operations Center**	6-3-22009
❏ **Use Electronic Protection**	6-0-21001
❏ **Process Enemy Prisoners of War**	19-2-C004
❏ **Process Captured Documents and Equipment**	19-2-C005
❏ **Defend Against Ambush**	6-7-41000

❏ **Plan, Coordinate, and Control Battery/Platoon**
Preparations for Operations in a NBC Environment 6-0-21005
 ❏ **Conduct Direct Fire** 6-7-22000
 ❏ **Perform Crater Analysis Operations** 6-7-11000
 ❏ **Perform Security Patrol Operations** 6-0-11000
 ❏ **Perform Observation and Surveillance** 6-0-11001
 ❏ **Reinforce and Restore the Battery Perimeter** 6-0-11002
 ❏ **Perform Field Sanitation Functions** 8-2-R315
 ❏ **Perform Antiarmor Operations** 6-0-11003
 ❏ **Perform Destruction of Material and Records** 6-0-11004
 ❏ **Prepare for Operations Under NBC Conditions** 03-3-C201
 ❏ **Prepare for Nuclear Attack** 03-3-C206
 ❏ **Respond to Initial Effects of a Nuclear Attack** 03-2-C329
 ❏ **Respond to the Residual Effects of a Nuclear Attack** 03-2-C328
 ❏ **Cross a Radiologically Contaminated Area** 03-3-C208
 ❏ **Perform Operational Decontamination**
(Vehicle Washdown) 03-2-C311
 ❏ **Conduct a Radiological Survey and Reconnaissance** 03-2-C032
 ❏ **Prepare for a Chemical Attack** 03-3-C202
 ❏ **Respond to a Chemical Attack** 03-2-C203
 ❏ **Cross a Chemically Contaminated Area** 03-2-C313
 ❏ **Perform Operational Decontamination**
(MOPP Gear Exchange) 03-3-C224
 ❏ **Conduct thorough Decontamination** 03-2-C312
 ❏ **Conduct a Chemical Reconnaissance** 03-2-C309
 ❏ **Conduct a Chemical Survey** 03-2-C310
 ❏ **Perform Combat Service Support Operations** 6-6-41000
 ❏ **Treat Casualties** 8-2-0003
 ❏ **Transport Casualties** 8-2-C316
 ❏ **Maintain Troop Morale and Combat Capability** 12-2-C402
 ❏ **Manage Oil Analysis Program** 6-0-21008
 ❏ **Perform Scheduled Services and Repairs** 6-0-21006
 ❏ **Provide Unit Supply Support** 10-2-R320
 ❏ **Draw Ammunition** 6-3-22006

Category III Tasks (Cont)

 ❏ **Transport Ammunition** 6-3-22007
 ❏ **Distribute and Store Ammunition** 6-3-22008
 ❏ **Repair Vehicles and Equipment** 6-0-24200 (105mm)
 ❏ **Manage Maintenance Records and Submit Reports** 6-0-21203 (155mm)
 ❏ **Repair Vehicles** 6-0-21200 (155mm)
 ❏ **Maintain the Prescribed Load List** 6-0-21204 (155mm)
 ❏ **Coordinate and Perform Equipment Recovery**
and Evacuation 6-0-21201 (155mm)
 ❏ **Establish an Organizational Maintenance Facility** 6-0-21202 (155mm)
 ❏ **Maintain Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants** 6-0-21205 (155mm)
 ❏ *Conduct Airborne Operations* *6-5-44000*
 ❏ *Conduct Air Assault Operations* *6-5-44001*
 ❏ *Conduct Air Assault Raid* *6-5-44002*

ENCLOSURE 2

Useful References for Army National Guard Field Artillery Battery Commanders

- ❏ **FM 25-100** — *Battle-Focused Training*
- ❏ **FM 25-101** — *Training the Force*
- ❏ **FC REG 220-3** — *Army National Guard and Army Reserve Component Training Assessment (1049-R)*
- ❏ **FC/ARNG REG 350-2** — *Reserve Component Training in America's Army*
- ❏ **FC REG 350-4** — *Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Training Association Program*
- ❏ **TC 25-10** — *A Leader's Guide to Lane Training*
- ❏ **TC 25-20** — *A Leader's Guide to After-Action Reviews*
- ❏ **TC 25-30** — *A Leader's Guide to Company Training Meetings*
- ❏ **ARTEP 6-037-30-MTP** — *Mission Training Plan for the Consolidated Cannon Battery*
- ❏ **FM 6-50** — *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Cannon Battery*
- ❏ **FM 6-50-60** — *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Paladin Battery*
- ❏ **STP 21-1** — *Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks (Skill Level 1)*
- ❏ **STP 21-2** — *Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks (Skill Level 2-4)*
- ❏ **-10s** — *Appropriate Weapon Systems and Equipment*

Small Change Makes Big Changes in Foreign Claims Process!

by LTC Stephen E. Castlen, CALL CAAT 12, Bosnia

Foreign claims processing for real estate actions are now simpler in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The change also furthers strategic goals of strengthening the civil functions of the local government. Captain Sarchio, a Senior Foreign Claims Commissioner, merely changed one box in the instruction section of the claim's form. Previously the form requested "proof of land ownership." The new form requires "A copy of your registered land certificate from the land registry office." This simple change has significant implications for claimants, claims adjudicators, and the local courts.

The U.S. Army is responsible for paying for all damage to real property caused by U.S. military forces in the former Yugoslavia. Before paying such claims, the Foreign Claims Commissioner (a claims judge advocate) must determine that the claimant actually owns the damaged property. Throughout the IFOR and SFOR missions, claims attorneys struggled to determine who are the rightful owners. Additionally, it was essential to determine the real owners of certain parcels of real estate prior to entering into leases for areas used by U.S. Forces.

Determining ownership of realty in the former Yugoslavia requires an understanding of the history, real estate laws, and the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the particular property. Compare this with the relative ease in determining ownership of U.S. real estate. In the United States, ownership is generally proven by a recorded deed and an attorney's title opinion. Yugoslavia also has a deed recording office, the Land Registry Office, in each local Canton (district), the Bosnian equivalent to a county. The similarity between the systems ends there.

Ownership confusion begins with Yugoslavia's history. After World War II, Yugoslavia nationalized most real property. For example, almost any citizen who owned more than 10 acres lost his land to the state. Those with ten acres or less were usually able to retain their land. The large land masses were divided and given to "the people." During 1991 and 1992, national legislation was implemented to return formerly confiscated (nationalized) lands to their former owners. This complicated process was on-going when hostilities erupted.

The recent war intensified the confusion. During the war, many records were misplaced, destroyed, stolen, or altered. As properties changed hands after battles, the victors often recorded "deeds" which gave land (mostly homes) to the occupiers' families. For example, many claims attorneys were suspicious of "victors' justice" if any record was dated after 1995. Also, there were laws that provided for forfeiture of property (generally homes) if the property was left unattended for more than 10 days. Such properties were often reassigned. Those laws were subsequently superseded by the Bosnian Constitution, which is part of the Dayton Peace Accord. Establishing land ownership and enforcing ownership rights through the court system was almost impossible. During the war the country was shattered. Their infrastructure, government, and court system were rendered ineffective and, in some areas, completely destroyed.

To establish land ownership, claimants were required to bring in any sort of proof of ownership available. "Proof" consisted of deeds (which often conflicted with another claimant's deed), other documents, and oral and written submissions. The types of proof were only limited by the imagination of the claimant. All of the conflicting and confusing evidence was analyzed by U.S. attorneys to determine ownership. The typical judge advocate does not have a complete understanding of Bosnian history, national and local laws, and other factors. Since the local courts were not functioning, claims attorneys did the best they could to make accurate and fair determinations. They looked for evidence of ownership or at least some arguable claim to the property. Deeds dated before the war, for example, were given more credibility than post-war-dated deeds. Post-war-dated deeds were suspicious since they often reflected "victors' justice" in the area. Regardless of the problems, claims adjudicators made decisions generally reserved to the local courts.

Much has changed in the former Yugoslavia since before the United Nations Protection Force arrived, throughout the Implementation Force, and into the Stabilization Force. Most importantly, the military mission under the Dayton Accords is near accomplishment. (The military mission is under Annex A of the Dayton Accords, known also as the Paris Agreement and as the General Framework Agreement for Peace.) Elections were conducted, airports and markets opened, and, most importantly for our purposes, courts were operating. The courts were not the fully functioning, fair, and effective systems normally found in Western nations, yet they are progressing. Bosnia and Herzegovina have incredibly difficult, and, some would argue, impossible, obstacles to overcome before achieving the goal of a functioning democracy. The U.S. Foreign Claims Commissioners' recognition of local court decisions would further confidence in, and respect for, their judicial acts.

After consultations with SFOR's Bosnian Staff Attorney, the 1st Armored Division (Forward) Claims Office changed its practice and the form they used.

Their research found that the national and local law requires proof of land ownership from the records in the "Cadastral," or land register book, located in the Land Registry Office. These offices are located in the Municipal Courts at each municipality. Land Registry Offices provide proof of land ownership by issuing a Land Registry Certificate. Claims personnel now base ownership solely on documents from the Land Registry Office. Bosnia and Herzegovina law recognizes those documents just as our courts recognize a deed as proof of ownership. Instead of U.S. military attorneys reconciling land ownership conflicts, claimants must now go through the court process to establish ownership. This forces the local courts to act on the issues. U.S. attorneys no longer handle matters outside their area of expertise. The action also furthers the goal of having correct land ownership records and recognizes the authority of the local court system. This was the rationale for the change to require proof of ownership from the "the Land Registry Office" rather than merely "proof of ownership."

Claimants must now prove land ownership in the local courts. Those courts are the proper forum for resolving these disputes. Additionally, land owners must eventually reconcile land records to legally transfer property during a sale or after death. This mandates that courts become involved and requires citizens to use their system. Most importantly, the action takes foreign lawyers (specifically, Army judge advocates) out of the process. The fact that the U.S. military recognizes the local court's decision adds prestige and respectability to the local court and instills confidence in their system.

The slight change in the claims form can be another step toward a better functioning claims operation and a fully functioning Bosnia and Herzegovina legal system. The key, of course, is that the decisions from the local courts be fair, and be perceived as fair, by the various factions. Disputes are now settled by the local judge's decision. Of course, it will take a period of time to determine whether the change enhances the peace and reconciliation process. However, there is no doubt that the change gives the local populace the opportunity and responsibility to handle their own legal conflicts. Will it succeed? The jury is still out on that question.

Techniques and Procedures

✔ **When possible, judge advocates should use local land records and local courts to establish ownership of realty.** In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the "Cadastral," or land register book from the Land Registry Office, should be the only source recognized to establish ownership. Disputes among local citizens should be adjudicated by the local courts.

✔ **Claims judge advocates must remain flexible to changing their procedures, tactics, forms, and other claims processing methods as the deployment environment changes during peacekeeping operations.**

✔ **Claims judge advocates must analyze the military and political repercussions when changing claims processing methods.**

✔ **Any changes to claims processing methods must ensure that fairness is the end product.** Claims processing must be fair, and the local population must perceive that the process is fair. Any changes to claims processing methods must consider the impact on fairness and the perception that the change will have on the locals. This must continually be monitored after the change to ensure that fairness goals are continually achieved.✪

YUGOSLAVIA

• Zagreb

Belgrade •

• Titograd

• Skopje

NATO   SFOR
ARMIJA SJEDINJENIH DR@AVA
UNITED STATES ARMY

ZAHTJEVI ZA OBE[TE]ENJE PRIVATNOG VLASNI[TVA
CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY DAMAGES

We will require the following documents in order to process your claim. **KEEP A COPY OF ALL DOCUMENTS FOR YOUR RECORD:**

Potrebni su nam slede}i dokumenti da bismo mogli obraditi va{ zahtjev za naknadu {tete. **SACUVAJTE KOPIJE SVIH DOKUMENATA ZA SEBE:**

1. Letter fully explaining your claim including the amount in DM that you wish to claim

1. Izjava kojom potpuno obrazla`ete Va{ zahtjev za naknadu {tete uklju~uju}i iznos u DM koji tra`ite.

2. A copy of your I.D. card.

2. Kopija li~ne karte.

3. A copy of your registered land certificate from the land registry office.

3. Kopija Zemlji{no-knji`nog izvatka.

4. A copy of your property insurance certificates.

4. Kopiju police osiguranja za vlasni{tvo ako postoji.

5. Original invoices for property repair and/or estimate of repair.

5. Original ra~una za popravku vlasni{tva i/ili detaljnu procjenu {tete.

6. A copy of the local police report or IFOR military police (if available).

6. Kopiju zapisnika lokalne policije, ili zapisnik VP SFOR-a (ako postoji).

7. The name of the U.S. Army unit that caused the damage and the name of the unit's commander.

7. Ime Ameri~ke jedinice koja je uzrokovala {tetu i ime komandira te jedinice.

8. Any photographs you may have of your damaged property.

8. Po mogu}nosti dostavite fotografije o{te}enja na Va{em vlasni{tvu.

We cannot process your claim if these documents are not provided.

Mi ne mo`emo obraditi Va{ zahtjev ukoliko nam ne po{aljete ove dokumente.

PLEASE SEND THESE DOCUMENTS TO:

MOLIMO VAS DA PO[ALJETE OVE DOKUMENTE NA SLEDE]U ADRESU:

Tuzla Airbase
Task Force Eagle Headquarters
ATTN: Staff Judge Advocate Office
Tuzla 75000
Tel: 075-814-241 lok 762-7083

Providing Assistance to Civil Authorities: Flood Control - One Experience
by MAJ James E. Hutton, Military Analyst, Center for Army Lessons Learned

> *This article is based on what one battalion, stationed in Germany, experienced when it was called upon to assist in flood control. The floods were the result of heavy downpours followed by a nearby river overflowing its banks. The flooding threatened a key communication station and an electrical station providing power to the region. Moreover, had the flooding not been stemmed, the flow of water could have created significant damage to the U.S. Army* **kaserne** *located on the outskirts of the town.*
>
> *The experiences described here, and the lessons listed in the final section, are limited to this operation. Conclusions about future assistance, usefulness for updating unit standing operating procedures, and preparing for similar occurrences are left to the reader's judgment.*

Introduction

Units, whether in the continental United States (CONUS), or overseas may be called upon to assist local authorities in response to various crises. Supporting local authorities can take many forms and our ability to provide help will vary in size and scope.

This article is about assistance given to a small German town by a field artillery battalion. The battalion, stationed in the town, provided planning, equipment and manpower, and execution of emergency services which successfully protected key facilities in the town.

To evaluate this undertaking we begin by examining the battalion's mission and planning processes. We then look at the subsequent tasks required of the battalion for accomplishing that mission. The focus then moves to the phases of the operation in which the tasks were performed. The final section assesses the lessons from the operation and provides some suggestions for preparing for similar operations in the future.

Mission: Assist Local Civil Authorities

The mission for the operation came quickly. The flow of water in the area was much greater than anticipated following seasonal rains. A nearby river swelled far beyond its normal levels. The battalion's higher headquarters, a brigade stationed on the same *kaserne*, responded to a call for assistance from the local *buergermeister* to augment efforts by the fire and police departments.

Following receipt of the brigade's directive, the battalion's mission statement was simple:

> **"Under the supervision of the…brigade, and in cooperation with local civil authorities, (the battalion) (-), fills sandbags to augment existing inventories in the (town). (The battalion) will be prepared to fill and deliver 1,500 additional sandbags if the authorities request such assistance."**

The commander intended to provide the assistance to quell the flow of water, protecting a key communications station, and a local power station (which, significantly, provided electricity to the *kaserne*). To do this, he intended to use approximately 100 soldiers and leaders to provide the manpower to move to a central sandbagging area, fill an unspecified amount of sandbags, emplace the sandbags at various locations, and withdraw from the location as warranted by conditions. Mission accomplishment, the end state, was that the communications and power stations were protected and, if flooding continued, the *kaserne* was protected by blocking water routes. Finally, all tasks had to be accomplished in a safe manner -- protecting our personnel was paramount.

Both the battalion and brigade commanders' instructions were clear and simple: protect the town and *kaserne* and do it safely.

Associated Tasks

Although the operation required about 100 personnel (plus another 70 for contingencies), each of the batteries in the battalion played key roles. The headquarters and service battery had unique personnel and equipment capabilities, while the firing batteries had the preponderance of the labor force. Tasks were divided to ensure an adequate number of personnel, command and control, maximum use of correct skills, and a ready contingency force.

Each of the batteries provided an equal amount of commonly held equipment. The equipment included shovels, sandbags, High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 5-ton trucks, road-guard vests, and associated items. Personal equipment was also the responsibility of each of the battery commanders. The list of items for each person included the following:

  ✔ **Gortex jacket and trousers**
  ✔ **Rubber overboots**
  ✔ **Two (2) pairs of gloves**
  ✔ **Cold Weather liner (the temperature was in the 40-50 degree (Fahrenheit) range throughout the operation.**
  ✔ **Soft cap**
  ✔ **Extra dry uniform (to be kept in waterproof bag)**
  ✔ **Dry socks in a plastic bag (kept in cargo pocket)**

Headquarters and service battery provided much of the service support for the operation. Medics and the battalion ambulance, under the control of the headquarters and service battery commander in the garrison, were provided to key locations. The battalion staff provided continuous planning and supervision at the sandbagging site, each of the protection sites, and technical support (i.e., communications, battalion-level maintenance, etc.) and chaplain support. The headquarters and service battery commander established the base station (at the sandbagging site) and maintained supervision of the staff in the absence of the commander. (*The battalion executive officer was the acting commander for this operation and the assistant S3 (a captain) served as the S3. The battalion commander, the battalion S3, and approximately 70 other personnel were supporting a ceremony approximately 500 kilometers away*).

Headquarters and service battery also provided food and beverages to the various sites on a continuing basis. Travel between the *kaserne* and the sandbag/protection sites, fortunately, was unhindered throughout the operation. Cooks drove 2-1/2-ton trucks to and from the sites, escorted by HMMWVs. The lead HMMWV was equipped with communications equipment not available in the trucks.

The battalion's "A" Battery provided most of the personnel for the ceremony discussed above. The battery was, however, required to provide its remaining (approximately 30 available) personnel as the contingency force. During the course of the operation, the personnel were not needed and simply remained in an on-call status.

"B" Battery provided the preponderance of the soldier support for the main effort. The battery assigned a lieutenant as the sandbag site officer-in-charge (OIC) who served as the primary point of contact for labor activities. He also served as the liaison between the battalion and the *kaserne* director of engineering and housing (DEH). The DEH, in turn, provided liaison to civil officials. The battery also provided 5-ton trucks and drivers to support soldier movement, Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs) for sandbag hauling as necessary, and two HMMWVs for command and control.

The primary contingency force was provided by "C" Battery. The battery provided an officer who remained at the sandbag site to serve as a liaison for his battery and to call key battery personnel in case the contingency force was needed. The personnel in the contingency force were prepared to assume the same mission as "B" Battery in case of an extended duration of the mission or if flooding worsened.

Phases of the Operation

Battalion operations proceeded in three phases. **Phase one** of the operation was the filling of sandbags at the sandbag site. Because the space was limited, a maximum of only 15 personnel could actively fill sandbags at any time. This fact, not known until the site was inspected by battalion personnel, actually worked in the battalion's favor. Crews were able to work quickly and take frequent rests from the actual digging and filling. When not digging and filling, the remaining personnel prepared the bags for use, tied the filled bags, and loaded the bags on trucks for transport. This work continued as the local authorities monitored the condition of levies and the situation at the key protection sites.

Phase two of the operation had two parts: Part one was the actual emplacement of the bags at the key protection sites. Part two, a "be-prepared mission," was to commit the contingency force to the sandbag site to fill 1,500 sandbags. The "be-prepared" portion would also require movement of part of a building to allow more personnel to get to the sand for bag filling.

Flooding did not increase during the operation, and part two of phase two never became necessary. The emplacement of the sandbags at the key protection sites proved successful. Soldiers were able to move out of the area before the flood waters reached the sites and the bags blocking water, which did not exceed a foot in the affected areas, did not threaten the facilities.

Phase three involved the redeployment of soldiers and equipment to the *kaserne*. Because the nearby flow of water was swift and unpredictable, strict accounting for personnel was required. Each soldier was assigned, and acknowledged, a buddy for the duration of the operation. Squad leaders, platoon sergeants and the OIC provided redundant checks of personnel upon arrival at the site, every two hours via radio, and prior to redeployment. Battery commanders were required to personally account for all personnel (and major equipment) upon arrival at the *kaserne*. Each commander notified the acting battalion commander who, in turn, issued his report to the brigade.

Operational Lessons Learned

This operation was not listed in the battalion's tactical or garrison SOP. No person in the battalion had expertise in flood control or waterway management. Yet the civil authorities recognized that a U.S. Army battalion's ability to quickly organize, focus on a clear mission, develop specific tasks, and accept direction and guidance from local officials, made it highly qualified to provide emergency assistance.

The following lessons from the experience may provide the basis for creating a portion of a garrison SOP that is related to emergency relief to local agencies:

☛ **Designate a liaison officer early.** In instances involving assistance to governments in foreign countries, the liaison officer must be conversant in the local language.

☛ **Use standard communication means within the battalion *in addition* to any civilian provided communication devices.** Soldiers and leaders are familiar with Army equipment -- use the civilian-provided equipment as a secondary source. Equip key leaders with both.

☛ **Purchase reflective road guard vests for all personnel.** Most of this operation was conducted at night in hazy conditions. Despite use of lights, soldiers in battle dress uniforms (BDUs) were very hard to see especially at the protection sites which had no outside lighting.

☛ **Use strip maps.** The use of strip maps proved invaluable when dealing with the local civilians. Have military maps available for use in calling for emergency assistance. The maps must include routes to health facilities, key operational sites, and special procedures in effect (i.e., how to travel on the roads which may have traffic signals turned off or are inoperable).

☛ **Use equipment properly.** If digging calls for the use of shovels, use shovels. It is dangerous to use equipment for tasks for which it is not designed.

☛ **Position OICs and other leaders at each key location.**

☛ **Plan continuously for contingency operations.** Situations involving emergency operations change often and fast. Ensure new plans are disseminated quickly and to the right people.

Conclusion

Military units are often called upon to conduct operations that are not combative in nature. This trend is likely to continue. Battalions can use normal planning mechanisms (i.e., operations orders, directives etc.) to quickly focus on the important aspects of the operation. Commanders must also inform local officials of the limitations of their battalions' ability to support emergencies. By narrowing the mission, providing clear intent, listing specific tasks, and supplying supervisory oversight, units can operate safely and will positively affect the outcome in almost any circumstance. **Prepare for emergency support missions and conduct safe operations -- your neighbors are depending on you!**✪

Foreign Area Officers and Special Forces:
Synergy in Combined Peacekeeping Operations
by CPT Joseph B. King, Senior Fellow, George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies

INTRODUCTION

With U.S. forces increasingly involved in multi-national peace and stability operations, there is significant requirement for effective liaison elements between U.S. commands and foreign contingents.   A variety of different options are available for the manning of these teams. (See Figure 1.) In the case of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), the liaison structure was essentially an Operations-Other-Than-War (OOTW) variant of the coalition warfare liaison teams used in Operation DESERT STORM. In both cases, these teams were called Coalition Support Teams (CSTs) and were based on the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA). In Operation JOINT GUARD in Bosnia-Herzegovina, liaison with non-English-speaking contingents has evolved into a mix of Special Forces Liaison Coordination Elements (LCEs) and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs). Separately, each of these elements brings unique and appropriate skills and capabilities to the mission. ***Working together, SFODA and FAO liaisons compliment and reinforce each other and greatly enhance the integration of the foreign contingent into the combined effort.***


FIGURE 1. OPTIONS FOR LIAISON TEAMS TO FOREIGN CONTINGENTS.

REQUIREMENTS FOR LIAISON ELEMENTS

To determine the best composition of a liaison element for a foreign contingent, we must first identify the prerequisite skills necessary for success. The primary requirement is **language capability.** The ability to communicate directly with commanders, staff officers, and soldiers in their own tongue cannot be over emphasized. The next most important requirement is **effective staff work.** The LO will not only need to clearly understand how the contingent that he supports is organized, but also how the next echelon above the supported unit operates as well. The third requirement is for the LO to **understand his contingent's unique national character.** This appreciation of culture, history, and national mind-set will promote his acceptance by the supported unit and his ability to interface with the U.S. command structure. The last prerequisite is **strategic perspective.** The LO must realize that at times the partnership and cooperation between nations is more important than specific missions within the peacekeeping operation. In generic terms, a good LO is a mature, experienced, language-qualified staff officer.

SFODA CAPABILITIES

A Special Forces ODA is unique in the broad range of skills and capabilities among its members. By MTOE, an ODA is a 12-man team commanded by a captain with a warrant officer as his assistant. All other members of the team are NCOs **specially trained in operations, intelligence, weapons, engineer/demolitions, medicine, or communications.** Each member of an SFODA must be **qualified in a foreign language** (at least at a 1+ level in reading and listening on the Defense Language Proficiency Test). Additionally, Special Forces are equipped with **long-range communications equipment** which can serve as a tremendous interoperability asset when used to support multi-national peacekeeping operations. They are also **trained to direct close air support and call in medical evacuation helicopters** if necessary. If the supported foreign contingent is at a remote base, the SFODA is best **organized to sustain itself with minimal assistance from its hosts.** Depending on the level of sophistication of the supported unit, the ODA is also **qualified to advise and train the foreign contingent** in a variety of mission-related tasks from base camp security and patrolling to field sanitation. *An SFODA is essentially a small, relatively self-contained combat unit, accustomed to working with foreign forces, yet capable of operating independently from other U.S. elements.*

SFODA SHORTFALLS AS LIAISON ELEMENTS

While the SFODA brings many assets to a liaison team in theory, in practice sometimes there are some shortfalls. For example, on a given team there **may only be one or two language-qualified personnel** who are trained in the target language for the supported foreign contingent. The reason for this is that the SFODA must be prepared to deploy anywhere in theatre to accomplish a variety of missions, and most theatres (with the possible exception of USSOUTHCOM) encompass a number of different languages. Additionally, the DLPT standard for SF personnel only requires a **cursory working knowledge of the language**. Secondly, while the detachment commander, a captain, may have worked on a battalion or brigade staff, **staff experience certainly is not a prerequisite for detachment command**. At a minimum, all SFODA commanders will be CAS[3] (Combined Arms Service and Staff School) trained. The SFODA team members only receive **limited cultural, military, and political orientation to the supported nation** prior to deployment. The majority of the team's sensitivity in these areas is derived from practical experience on deployments to various countries in theatre. In the last regard, strategic perspective, the SFODA is in relatively good shape. Special forces soldiers are accustomed to working in the strategic arena and are aware of the political implications of their operations. However, an SFODA is usually **focused more on the tactical execution** of strategically significant missions than on all of the potential political and diplomatic ramifications of such operations.

One additional handicap of Special Forces LCEs is command, control, and reporting. Typically LO sections to foreign contingents fall under the operations officer, G3 of the U.S. command. Liaison elements from Special Operations Forces (SOF) fall under the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and have **separate command and reporting channels**. SOF Liaison and Coordination Elements report to a Special Operations Coordination and Control Element (SOCCE), which, in turn, relays information to the U.S. command. *Ultimately the liaison team (SF, FAO, or otherwise) supports the U.S. command and should report directly to the G3 without any intermediaries*. In this case the LCEs should be under the operational control of the same American unit to which the foreign contingent reports. If the goal of the SOCCE is to integrate and coordinate SOF with a conventional headquarters, then there is truly no reason to have a separate, parallel command and reporting structure. It further complicates and delays reports which are already slowed because of translation.

FAO CAPABILITIES

Foreign Area Officers are **regional military specialists.** They must have a minimum language proficiency level of 2 in reading, listening, and speaking on the DLPT. Usually these officers have attended **extended language training** at the Defense Language Institute at the outset of their FAO training. To enter the FAO program, one must be a **senior, branch-qualified captain.** FAOs take advantage of **in-country training** (ICT) opportunities which are essentially internships to permit the officer to learn about his assigned region through service abroad in a U.S. embassy or military group. There are also opportunities to deploy to the region with U.S. forces for combined exercises. FAOs attend **advanced civil schooling** for area studies and international relations. All of these experiences provide the FAO with a broad-based knowledge of regional culture, economics, politics, and military organizations. His study and experience abroad give him a **sound understanding of the region's strategic significance** to U.S. policy and interests.

FAO SHORTFALLS AS LIAISON OFFICERS

While for the most part FAOs are well suited to the liaison task, they also fall short in some areas. For example, FAOs are quite limited in their communications capabilities unless they are augmented with signal assets. A FAO liaison team is not an MTOE organization and comes with **no organic equipment or technical training** (other than what the officer may have learned during previous assignments in his basic branch). Most FAOs have had some staff experience previously in their careers, but it is **possible that a FAO may have never served on a brigade or higher staff.** Additionally, FAOs are drawn from all branches, therefore a FAO LO theoretically **may not be familiar with the type of unit that he supports** (i.e., a Transportation-branched FAO supporting a foreign infantry contingent). Lastly, with only one or two FAOs on a liaison team, **continuous 24-hour operations are not possible** without personnel augmentation.

OPTIMAL LIAISON TEAMS

The intent of this article is not to compare FAOs to SFODAs, but rather to look at the suitability of both of these elements to serve as liaison teams to non-English-speaking foreign contingents during multinational peacekeeping operations. The shortcomings of one element are largely compensated by the capabilities of the other. (See Figure 2). If manpower and mission requirements permit, a **liaison team consisting of a FAO *and* an SFODA is clearly a very complimentary and effective match**.


FIGURE 2. COMPLIMENTARY ASPECTS OF COMBINED SF/FAO LIAISON TEAMS.

Many of the **shortfalls of both FAOs and SFODAs can be overcome by careful selection and training** of liaison elements. For example, a Special Forces Group can choose a team which is "stacked" with personnel who are trained in the target language for the supported foreign contingent (or it can task-organize such a team from available personnel). Pre-deployment language refresher courses can be provided to raise proficiency to a level required for daily and operational contact. In the case of FAOs, officers should be selected to be LOs who have some familiarity with the type of operations which are conducted by the supported foreign contingent (i.e., combat arms, combat support, or combat service support). An FAO with staff experience at brigade or higher levels is also preferred. If a purely FAO team is chosen for the liaison task, it will have to be augmented with communications assets and operators.

SITUATIONAL VARIABLES

Ultimately the composition, selection, and training of these liaison elements will have to be tailored to the specific nature of the peacekeeping mission and the supported foreign contingent. For example, the language requirement becomes more significant when the contingent is a **non-English speaking major subordinate unit directly under the U.S. command.** The strategic perspective aspect becomes more relevant when the foreign unit is from a nation which is a **critical strategic partner** to the U.S. and/or a major power. Both of these variables exist in the case of the Russian Brigade which falls under the U.S.-led Multinational Division (North) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Advisory roles are more significant with contingents coming from **smaller, less well-equipped armies**. This was the case for a number of Special Forces coalition support teams in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Subject-matter expertise is ideal for the liaison element if the foreign contingent is some type of **support unit.** In these cases, if language qualified experts cannot be found, specially qualified officers or NCOs with interpreters make the best LOs.

It has long been recognized that **Special Forces and FAOs often operate in the same multi-national arena**. This is not only true in peace operations, but also in security assistance, foreign internal defense, coalition warfare, and in other areas where the U.S. military operates or trains abroad. Each group brings an array of skills, capabilities, and experiences to the mission which **greatly contribute to the cohesiveness and success of combined operations.** For these very reasons, during the old "dual-track" officer personnel management system, Special Forces officers made excellent FAOs who returned to their basic branch assignments as better Special Forces officers due to increased exposure to, and study of, their assigned theatres. Commanders must be aware not only of the unique aspects of these two elements but also of the complimentary and synergistic effect created when FAOs and SF are used together as liaison elements for foreign contingents. Whenever possible, this is the optimal combination, not only for the successful integration of multinational units, but also for the "real-world" training opportunities it provides.✪

EXPERIENCES OF A MEDICAL LOGISTICS DETACHMENT IN THE BOSNIA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

by CPT Linda M.A. Estacio, Commander, 424th Medical Logistics Detachment, Bosnia

The Class VIII medical supply operation is the most responsive in the Bosnia Theater of Operations. Typically, these supplies will reach "customers" (units) within three to five days of a request. Medical logistics units must, of course, be this responsive, because the lives, health and safety of our forces are at stake without medicines or functional medical equipment at hand. In addition to supporting U.S. Army units (hospital and other medical units, divisional battalion aid stations, combat lifesavers, etc.), the medical logistics detachment in Bosnia also supports units from the U.S. Navy and Air Force, civilian contractors (Brown and Root), and a Norwegian Medical Company (NORMEDCO): 50 customers in all. Timely and appropriate preplanning resulted in successful support of such a large and varied customer base at the start of operations within Bosnia. With the arrival of a 15-soldier detachment from the 424th Medical Logistics Battalion, new challenges emerged to improve customer service and support.

The 424th, the first and only Army Reserve unit ever given the entire Class VIII mission in Bosnia, set about improving the delivery of medical supplies to customers/units, developing a stockage list of medical supplies, and improving computerization usage to effectively manage the operation. (In addition, the 424th was responsible for the repair of biomedical equipment, and blood distribution in theater. For purposes of clarity, these other operations will not be covered in this article.) These efforts included its own new set of challenges, which will be covered and summarized in this article.

By the time the 424th arrived in-country, a smooth-running CL VIII supply operation had been established. The U.S. Army Medical Material Center, Europe (USAMMCE), based in Pirmasens, GE, established contracts early on with a civilian trucking company in Bosnia, which guaranteed delivery of medicines and medical equipment repair parts every Monday, Wednesday and Friday. (Blood products were not included in these shipments.) Because of the efficiency of this service, previous medical logistics detachments had neither the need nor the requirement to maintain a stockage of medical supplies. Doctrinally, these units served as the forward-deployed company of a medical logistics battalion. As a consequence, customers requesting supplies would pick up their orders at the unit's location at Blue Factory (short def of BF) outside of Tuzla, Bosnia. The previous MEDLOG units also were not required to conduct customer assistance visits, since units came to them with questions while picking up their supplies.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

Immediately upon the 424th's arrival on station, the 30th Medical Brigade (higher headquarters) tasked the 424th with developing and maintaining a true medical stockage system. This would be similar to the logistics support company of a MEDLOG battalion. This decision was made in anticipation of the upcoming winter months, with the possibility of interrupted overland supply operations. Normally, a formulary of approved medicines would be available to determine which items were to be stocked and authorized for use among all medical units in theater. This list would be balanced by a customer's history of requested items over a period of time. Eventually, a record of "fast-moving" versus "slow-moving" items would be established to further refine the amount of a particular item to be stocked. Since neither a formulary nor a transaction history were available, customer units were polled as to what items they considered necessary, and identified which were "fast-moving" (i.e., rapidly consumed) items. Over time, a demand history was established, making it clearer which medicines were needed, which were critical and which were not. The history assisted in further refining the stockage lists. Fortunately, the winter of 1997 proved to be quite mild, and the threat of interrupted overland supply operations never materialized.

In addition, the 424th decided to take a more pro-active approach in providing service to customers. With this guiding principle in mind, and with development of the stockage list, based on a directed task from the 30th Med Bde, the 424th began the development of several implied tasks: delivery of both supplies and face-to-face customer service in the field, and improvement of computerization usage as a management tool.

As mentioned earlier, previous MEDLOG units functioned as distribution centers; customers would pick up supplies from the unit at Blue Factory. With the assistance of the 159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance), the 424th added the capability of shipping supplies directly to customers by air. The 424th accomplished this by taking advantage of the 159th routine flights to deliver supplies, or by specific slingload operations to the base camps. Both units benefited from the experience. The 424th did not previously have the opportunity to conduct slingload operations during normal Reserve drill weekends or during Annual Training. Soldiers in the 424th gained valuable experience in slingload operations which they will take back to the remainder of the battalion. The 159th also had the opportunity to refine their slingload training skills.

In addition, the 424th employed proactive, once-a-month visits with customers in the field to improve the quality of services, brainstorm ideas to overcome obstacles in supply operations, and to determine customer satisfaction. These visits supplemented routine face-to-face discussions with customers when they arrived to pick up supplies. This pro-active service made the unit more visible and accessible to customers in keeping with the philosophy, "Have we done everything we could to make our customer happy; did we earn our pay?" common in civilian industry and service. The 424th accomplished this by "piggybacking" with the 261st Preventive Medicine (PM) Detachment when the 261st did their routine monthly visits/inspections to field units. Again, both units benefited from the arrangement. With responsibility for manning the convoy with enough personnel shared between the two units, both the 424th and the 261st gave up fewer personnel for convoy duty. This allowed for more effective use of limited personnel resources.

Another important implied task involved improving the use of available computerization. MEDLOG units use the Theater Army Medical Management Information System (TAMMIS) to manage their operations. When used properly, and when given timely and accurate information, TAMMIS is a powerful tool for managing stockage, tracking customer requests and status of shipments, and financial accounting. Since previous MEDLOG units did not maintain a stockage, there was no need to use TAMMIS to its full capacity. These units used TAMMIS to generate financial reports on a monthly basis to brief the task force commander. With the establishment of a true stockage system, the 424th made a decision to run the financial reports weekly, to keep a more accurate account. In addition, the unit created custom-designed reports; therefore, customers could, on demand, receive the latest status of their supply requests. Most importantly, the unit integrated e-mail reports received from USAMMCE on the status of supplies requested, shipped or on backorder, with TAMMIS. Using this method, the 424th generated an accurate transaction history. Based on this information, the TAMMIS generated more realistic reorder points (ROPs). This is a crucial factor in a unit's ability to order supplies in a timely manner before there is a shortage of a critical item. The MEDLOG can also monitor a customer's usage of a particular commodity more accurately, and send a reminder if necessary to the customer that they are running short of a particular item. With the indefinite extension of the Bosnia mission, this will be a critical mission for all follow-on MEDLOG units. The 424th is proud to have the opportunity to pass on techniques and procedures for those who follow.

The 424th encountered a number of challenges which affected the unit mission in varying degrees. One of the major obstacles involved computers. The 424th deployed with outdated computer systems with only 386 or 486 memory capability. None of the unit computers had LAN (local area network) capabilities as well. This affected the ability of the 424th to connect to the server network, which degraded and sometimes interrupted the capacity to receive or send e-mail. This was crucial, since the unit routinely communicated with USAMMCE in Pirmasens, GE, via e-mail. The 424th also received several supply requisition requests via the Internet; some customer/units would attach FormFlow-created DA Form 3161s (Request for Issue/Turn-In) to their e-mail. Fortunately, through the local purchase of a laptop computer, the 424th increased its capacity to link with the theater's server network and continues to maintain the e-mail/internet communication system.

Another challenge involved the available space to store supplies. The medical logistics operation is housed in a rather small building. Currently, there is not enough space available to store all the lines of medicines or medical spare parts necessary. This includes refrigerated items, as well as hazardous materials (HAZMAT; e.g., oxygen bottles). Plans are being developed to address this issue for unit rotation, and for the benefit of future operations.

Summary

Although the medical logistics mission is often overlooked in the light of other, more glamorous units, it is nevertheless crucial to the success of any sustained operation. The ability to deliver medical supplies and repair medical equipment is vital to the lives, health and safety of our forces. The 424th is proud to have served with the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and prepared the way for extended operations for future MEDLOG units. The 424th informal unit motto says it all: **"Can Do, Will Do, DONE!"**✪

Medical Operations and Civil Affairs during Stabilization and Support Operations
CASE STUDY: *Physician of Posavina*
by MAJ William E. Carter, CALL OPSO, Bosnia

An excerpt from a press release by the Coalition Press Information Center at Eagle Base – April 8, 1998.

EAGLE BASE, Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina – With the encouragement of physician and civil affairs officers from MND-North, civilian doctors from throughout Bosnia came together in Bosanski Samac, April 6, to discuss pressing medical issues and to also pledge their cooperation in helping one another – regardless of ethnic distinctions – in finding solutions to future health problems. The day marked the official beginning of what local medical officials are calling **Physicians of Posavina.** *The society will continue to meet every month.*

This press release describes how physicians from all sides of the Bosnian conflict were brought together through the efforts of a combined medical and civil affair operation. This article examines the reasoning behind the success of this Medical – Civil Affairs (CA) operation for future use in other Stabilization and Support Operations and U.S. Army missions.

In Bosnia, the medical task force and the CA unit developed a unique method of incorporating available medical assets to support the task force commander's civil affairs campaign plan or civil-military operations (CMO). The CMO in the multinational division north MND(N) has two main focuses. The first is to develop military-civil action that enhances force protection within the division. The second is to promote the mission of MND(N), or to win the "hearts and minds" of the citizens. One of the points or "keys" outlined in the CA campaign plan was to bring the people from all ethnic groups together and, in turn, stimulating the freedom of moving within the area of

responsibility (AOR). One of the objectives of the campaign plan was to dissolve the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) that separated the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the Republic of Srpska (RS).

Both the CA community and the Army Medical Department conduct unique missions within the Army. The CA mission is to support the commander's relationship with civil authorities and civilian populace, promote mission legitimacy and enhance military effectiveness. The mission of the medical units is to provide combat health support to U.S. military personnel or "to conserve the fighting strength." Both have different missions, but, through proper planning and coordination, the two have combined in Bosnia to provide mutual support to each mission.

The medical task force in Bosnia developed a program called the Tri-Entity Physicians seminars, which later developed into a multi-ethnic group of physicians called the *Physician of Posavina.* As outlined in the press release, these seminars brought Croatian, Serbian and Muslim physicians together to discuss new medical techniques and procedures. Additionally, these gatherings allowed physicians with different medical specialties, such as orthopedics and internal medicine, to consult with one another on specific medical problems faced in their respected community, such as an increase in number of patients with kidney stones.

It is common in most societies, based on their professions, for physicians to be community leaders, either directly or indirectly. The positive interaction between these community leaders only enhances the peace process, stimulating freedom of movement and legitimizing the mission of NATO. The role of the medical task force and the CA unit in this program is that of a facilitator whose ultimate goal is to turn the program over to the physicians. This program that started in the northeastern part of the U.S. sector is being tried in other areas within the division AOR. The success of this program did not come easy. It took time, involved the corporations of numerous agencies within and outside the U.S. Army, proper planning and coordination.

The medical task force in Bosnia is unique because they have two CA officers assigned to their staff. The CA officers serve as a liaison between the medical task force and the CA unit to coordinate Medical-CA projects. The CA officers are part of the medical task force staff enabling them to better understand the capabilities and limitations of the medical task force. This helps educate the CA personnel to the capabilities of the medical task force. In turn, the CA officers educate the medical personnel on the role and the mission of civil affairs.

When one thinks of combined medical and CA operations, most people think about medical CMO projects such as the Medical Civil Action Program or MEDCAP from the Vietnam War. MEDCAP, initially conceived to assist the Vietnamese military in expanding their medical assets, soon developed into a program that provided free medical care for the local civilians. The Medical Readiness Training Exercise or MEDRETE has become the major medical CMO project for today's Army. Most MEDRETEs occur in SOUTHCOM's AOR and involve primarily U.S. Army Reserve medical units. Today's MEDRETEs closely resemble the MEDCAP of the past by providing limited free medical care to the local populace. This type of program could not have been executed by the medical task force in Bosnia for numerous reasons. The three most significant reasons are:

● **The medical task force was not equipped with supplies and personnel to provide medical support to both U.S. forces and local civilians.**
● **Providing random, free medical care violates U.S. laws and military regulations.** Section 401 of title 10, United States Code, chap 20 – Humanitarian and Other Assistance and Department of Defense Doctrine (DODD) 2205.2 – Humanitarian and Civil Assistance (HCA), forbid the distribution of medical supplies and equipment without the approval of the CINC.
● **Providing random, free medical care does not support the commander's intent concerning the CMO campaign.**

The Tri-Entity Physicians seminars fall within the guidelines of the above laws and regulations. The programs do not degrade from the primary mission of the medical task force and they support the commander's CA campaign plan. In developing a Medical-CA campaign plan, the medical task forces staff analyzed their higher headquarter's CA campaign plan and Medical-CA campaign plan prior to developing their own Medical-CA campaign. From their analysis, one of their courses of action called for the task force to facilitate medical seminars for the doctors in their AOR. Since the seminar program had to stay within the guidelines of U.S. laws and regulations, coordination occurred with the task force staff judge advocate office to ensure the program complied with these laws and regulations. Working together, the CA unit contacted the local physicians in the AOR and the medical task force staff developed an agenda for the first meeting. The first meeting occurred at the medical task force level hospital. A simple tour of the U.S. Army medical facility brought physicians from both the BiH Federation and the RS together. This gathering was a great success and led to more gatherings of the physicians resulting in the formation of the *Physician of Posavina.*

There were many lessons from this program that should be implemented in future Medical-CA operations. The program focused on long-term objectives, not quick-fix solutions to a problem based on the old proverb "that if you give a man a fish, you feed him for a day. But if you teach a man to fish, you will feed him for a lifetime." The program worked within the existing Bosnian medical system and did not try to replace their system nor did the program set expectation to develop an American model medical system. This program was designed to assist the current medical structure. The program's uniqueness did not compete with already established International Organization and Non-Governmental Organization humanitarian programs or the established Bosnia medical system. The Tri-Entity Physicians seminars focus on the needs of the local physician and the capabilities of the medical task forces as well as keep the program de minimis or "minimal cost." The task force staff judge advocate office was involved to ensure the program complied with U.S. laws and regulations. Finally, the program was well-coordinated with the CA units, medical task force and local medical community.

The medical seminar program met the needs of the physicians in Bosnia, supported the commander's intent for Civil-Military Operations and integrated the CA and medical community. It was a success story and, hopefully, this concept will be exported to other places. A seminar program for other professionals, such as mental health workers, is becoming active in the AOR. The idea of developing seminars to bring people once separated by war together based on their profession took ingenuity. It is this type of simple ingenuity that is needed to develop, plan and execute a meaningful and successful Medical-CA program. Both the CA units and the medical community can continue to achieve mission success if they continue to coordinate with each other, articulate their objectives, capabilities and limitations and work within these boundaries.✪

➜ BATTLES FROM CORTINA ✦

3-D MOUT

by MAJ Jeffrey D. Kulmayer

The Atlantican Army had been defeated, but its remnants had retreated into the Cortinian town of Shughart-Gordon. The U.S. brigade charged with attacking the town decided to have one battalion attack from the northwest and seize a foothold in the first three buildings. The main effort battalion would then pass through and continue clearing the town. Their first objective beyond the foothold was the northern three buildings -- 53, 54, and 55. The battalion identified building 54, the townhouse, as the key terrain in their initial objective and assigned the seizure of that building to the lead company.

Shughart-Gordon
VQ884412
(Not to Scale)

The assault began at 0425 as the company passed through its sister battalion and moved along the northern side of the city toward the house just to the left of the townhouse. It took only minutes for the lead platoon to clear the unoccupied house. A second platoon rushed the townhouse through the open area between the two buildings and pressed against the left side of the townhouse while a squad attempted to breach the door of the first apartment. The third platoon, meanwhile, stacked up on the north side of the house, waited for the call to follow and support.

The enemy opened up with whithering fire from the upper windows of the townhouse onto the breach squad. They then fired from the service station (bldg. 68) into the platoon between the house and the townhouse. The enemy in the dominating municipal building (bldg. 57) on the east side of the city cut down a number of soldiers in the third platoon waiting on the north side of the house. Finally, snipers and a machine-gunner in the hotel (bldg. 74) on the southern edge of the city added their fire to that of their comrades in the service station to completely dominate the southern side of the townhouse with direct fire. The company ultimately seized the townhouse, but was combat-ineffective due to casualties incurred approaching the building.

The assault on the townhouse illustrates the importance of three-dimensional terrain analysis in support of MOUT assaults. The fight inside a building is a difficult one, requiring infantry squads and platoons to perform room-clearing techniques as documented in **FM 90-10-1,** *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Builtup Areas,* to standard. But in the monthly battle for Shughart-Gordon, units sustain eight times as many casualties outside of buildings as inside. These casualties are typically the result of enemy fire from buildings other than the one being assaulted. The fight inside a building is difficult, but getting to the building is deadly.

A successful assault of the townhouse in the situation described above requires the isolation of the point at which friendly units want to enter the building from enemy direct fire. A two-dimensional map view leads one to develop a course of action focused only on buildings immediately adjacent to the townhouse. A three-dimensional view of the problem reveals that in addition to the immediate tasks of suppressing the enemy in the townhouse (to include upper floors), the unit must also identify and suppress surrounding buildings and dominating terrain much deeper in the town. The hotel and the municipal building -- both four-story structures -- give the enemy the ability to dominate both northern and southern approaches to the townhouse. Absent action by the battalion to isolate the townhouse from the enemy in the hotel and municipal building, the assaulting company will surely sustain tremendous casualties even before getting to the difficult task of room clearing.

The isolation of the townhouse is a battalion fight, requiring the synchronization of a variety of assets in support of the company's assault. Given an opportunity to replay the battle, the following tasks could be assigned to "set the conditions" for a successful assault:

● **Kiowa in support by fire position oriented on the north and west sides of bldg. 57, the municipal building.**

● **Kiowa in support by fire position oriented on the north side of bldg.74, the hotel.**

● **Mortar smoke target 50m northwest of bldg. 57 and at the intersection southeast of the building for obscuration of enemy fires.**

● **Adjacent battalion's infantry in foothold, bldg. 52, suppresses the north side of bldg. 68.**

● **Adjacent battalion's infantry in foothold, bldg. 67, suppresses the south side of bldg. 54.**

● **One company from the assault battalion establishes a support-by-fire position in the woods north of bldg. 53 and suppresses the north side of bldg. 54 and any visible targets in bldg. 57.**

● **The platoon from the assault company in bldg. 53 establishes a support-by-fire position and suppresses the north side of bldg. 68 and overwatches the lead platoons movement into the first apartment.**

● **The platoon to assault bldg. 54 employs smoke to obscure enemy from bldg. 54, 68, and other unknown enemy positions to the southeast as it crosses from bldg. 53 and enters the front apartment of bldg. 54.**

MOUT is more than room clearing. A 3-D view of the terrain is essential to gaining a complete understanding of observation and avenues of approach. The close fight -- inside the building -- is difficult and decentralized, with control of the movement from room to room most often in the hands of squad and platoon leaders. Success in the movement from building to building is a combined arms fight, the control of which requires the active involvement of a battalion command post. Seeing the terrain in 3-D will identify the opportunities for employment of all the battalion's combat power and enable the battalion to "set the conditions" for successful platoon and company assaults.✪

THE PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION COMPONENT OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT
by MAJ Arthur N. Tulak, CALL Military Analyst

Army Information Operations (IO) are comprised of the three interrelated components of *Operations, Relevant Information and Intelligence (RII),* and *INFOSYS.* The Army uses three operations to conduct IO: 1) command and control warfare (C^2W); 2) civil affairs (CA), and; 3) public affairs (PA). The Operations component of IO consists of PSYOP, Physical Destruction, Electronic Warfare, Military Deception, OPSEC (the five elements of C^2W), Civil Affairs, and Public Affairs. A peace operation information campaign will employ all these components to shape the battlespace. Through offensive IO, the peace operations force can target such things as adversary leadership, decisionmaking and C^2, with the goal of controlling adversary decision process tempo, and attack the adversary's centers of gravity through nonlethal means to:

> ➤ **undermine the adversary's legitimacy or actions contrary to the provisions of a peace agreement;**
> ➤ **reinforce positive behavior in compliance with the peace accord;**
> ➤ **cajole compliance by stressing the responsibilities and actions required of the adversary under the provisions of the peace accord.** [1]

In combat operations, the commander accomplishes the mission through the application of lethal combat power in combined arms operations. He uses IO to disrupt or destroy enemy information systems, primarily through EW and physical destruction.[2] Physical destruction is the most effective means for denying the enemy use of his C^2 systems and achieving an information advantage in the application of force.[3] In peace operations, however, the principle of restraint and the neutrality of the peace operations force mean that lethal power is rarely the means to mission accomplishment.

In peace operations, the enemy is not one of the warring factions, but the conflict itself. Diplomatic considerations predominate over purely military requirements and impose constraints on the force.[4] A common characteristic of peace operations has been the necessity to observe the principles of *legitimacy* and *restraint.* Although U.S. forces in a Peace Enforcement operation may have to apply lethal combat power during the initial stages, or as the result of acts which violate the terms of the imposed peace, the principles of restraint and legitimacy limit the efficacy of lethal combat power. The principle of *restraint* requires that forces "apply appropriate military capability prudently," with due regard for collateral damage.[5] In peace operations, lethal force is the instrument of last resort. ***"When force must be used, its purpose is to protect life or compel, not to destroy…the conflict, not the belligerent parties, is the enemy…the use of force should be a last resort and, whenever possible, should be used when other means of persuasion are exhausted."***[6]

Of the five elements of C^2W listed above, *physical destruction* may seem outside acceptable constructs for use in a peace operation where lethal force is used only as a last resort. However, physical destruction is "the application of combat power to destroy **or *neutralize* enemy forces and installations."**[7] It is primarily in the ***neutralization*** of adversary C^2 functions and processes that physical destruction is manifested in peace operations. "One can 'target' a (C^2) system without designating it for actual destruction;" effective C^2W aims to defeat the adversary C^2 system, "whether by physical destruction or effective nullification."[8] The destruction of a target means that the adversary capability is degraded or shut down, either permanently, or for a specified period of time.[9]

Although SFOR did not physically destroy any of the FWFs' ability to command and control their elements, IO were aimed at *influencing* their C^2 decisionmakers. In Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD, C^2W also aimed at co-opting the FWFs' C^2 apparatus to facilitate their compliance with the Dayton Peace Accord and to monitor that compliance as well.[10]

FWF C^2 facilities were targeted for *destruction* during early NATO air operations supporting UNPROFOR in the autumn 1995, known as *Operation DELIBERATE FORCE,* during which there were 3,515 sorties against Bosnian Serb military positions.[11] This NATO air campaign is credited for having pushed the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table at Dayton Ohio. During the siege of Sarajevo, the combination of attacks by NATO aircraft delivering precision air strikes against Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) positions, and an attack with 13 Tomahawk land attack missiles against VRS C^2 facilities, disrupted VRS C^2 systems and achieved the termination of the bombardment of Sarajevo and convinced Serb troops to remove their heavy weapons.[12]

Physical destruction operations in peace operations focus on the ***neutralization*** of adversary capabilities. In determining whether or not physical destruction operations apply, the IO planner must identify the adversary's means to effect the situation, and then target those means for neutralization. Tactics employed to neutralize the adversary's ability to effect the situation or exercise C^2 include:

> ➤ **Occupying or controlling access to facilities used by the adversary for command, control and communication (C^3) and early warning;**
> ➤ **Shutting down power sources for C^3 and early warning systems;**
> ➤ **Delaying groups or individuals of the adversary's support base attempting to mass;**
> ➤ **Arresting or detaining key individuals and instigators of the adversary support base to prevent them from fomenting disturbance at "hot spots."**

Physical occupation of, or controlling access to, adversary C^3 and early warning facilities is a means of temporarily denying the adversary use of those capabilities. If the peace operation force cannot occupy the facility or control access to it, cutting off its power may provide a less-intrusive means of temporarily depriving the adversary use of the facility's functions. Examples of C^3 and early warning facilities that could possibly be targeted for physical destruction include: TV and radio transmitting towers and stations, police stations, air raid sirens, and radio frequencies used to transmit radio or telephone communications.

If the adversary attempts to conduct demonstrations by massing angry crowds, then delaying the movement of adversary supporters through the use of checkpoints and roadblocks denies the adversary the ability to mass. Typically, demonstrations carried out in Bosnia by the FWFs involved busing in crowds of supporters from outlying towns and villages to achieve a mass. The demonstrators sought to dominate the situation by stretching the peace operations force and forcing them to spread their forces thinly as they attempted to monitor and control the situation. Roadblocks need not be formal, and ruses may be used to send the inbound mobs on detour after detour.

Crowds need leaders and instigators to be set into action. Detaining key leaders and instigators before the crowd assembles removes the volatile agent from the combustible mix. If the crowd has already assembled, it may be possible to remove instigators and agitators attempting to ignite the crowd into action.

Physical Destruction Operations in TFE

Seizure of Bosnian-Serb Radio/Television Towers.

Following the civil war in Bosnia, much of the communications media lay in ruins. At the cessation of hostilities, newspapers and magazines were few, expensive, and had limited circulation. In such circumstances, broadcast media were extremely influential, despite the small number of operating transmitters. The broadcast media of the FWFs were politically driven and controlled. Reporting was biased by either omission of the truth, distortion through emphasis on only those elements of information which reinforced a political view, or outright disinformation, i.e., fiction-based propaganda. In May 1997, the North Atlantic Council granted authority to SFOR to take actions against any media undermining the peace accords.[13]

During the early summer of 1997, a power struggle erupted between the rival factions of the Bosnian Serb (Republika Serpska, or RS) leadership, that is, the RS President Bijlana Plavsic and the Bosnian-Serb member of the Bosnian presidency, Momcilo Krajisnik (loyal to the former RS President and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic). The struggle began when Madame-President Plavsic decided to dissolve the RS parliament and called for new elections in November 1997. The struggle caused a split within the RS state television, with journalists and editors from the Banja Luka studio deciding to split away from Pale direction after Pale manipulated a broadcast on SFOR searches in police stations. SFOR and OHR tried to exploit these developments to their advantage. SFOR and OHR encouraged SRT Pale to tone down its anti-Dayton, anti-NATO campaign and air programs on the DPA sponsored by the international community. In exchange for their cooperation, they would remain open, whereas noncompliance would bring military action.[14]

The pro-Karadzic, or Pale faction and its politically-controlled media continued the barrage of anti-SFOR propaganda and hate. SRT television stations for example, referred to the Muslim head of Bosnia's Presidency as "Alija Izetbegovic, Muslim murderer."[15] These same stations televised anti-SFOR propaganda to the Bosnian Serb audience attacking the legitimacy of SFOR and its mandate. One anti-SFOR propaganda item accused SFOR of using "low-intensity nuclear weapons," during the 1995 attacks on VRS positions around Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Majevica in 1995.[16] In another propaganda piece, Serbian Radio Television (SRT) showed alternating images of World War II German Army and present-day NATO forces while the commentator drew the comparison, likening SFOR soldiers to a Nazi occupation force.[17] NATO officials have expressed concerns that such "venomous propaganda" threatens the safety of the NATO-led peace operations force.[18]

Despite the efforts of both the High Representative and the OSCE, the dissident RS faction repeatedly refused to cease or moderate their broadcasts. After SRT Pale heavily edited a tape on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) war crimes mission, using it to spread disinformation, the international community took direct action. Under the authority of the GFAP and orders from the NATO Council and the Office of the High Representative, SFOR seized four SRT transmission towers, considerably reducing the footprint of SRT. The seizure of these towers was a *physical destruction mission* in that SFOR targeted the TV transmitter towers for neutralization, which is a condition achieved by physical destruction operations. Within TFE, U.S. soldiers secured several transmitters used by media elements loyal to the pro-Karadzic faction. On 1 October 1997, TFE units executed the physical destruction operation, securing the Bosnian-Serb television/radio transmitter complexes on Hill 619 in Duga Njiva, Hill 562 near Ugljevik, Trebevica (near Sarajevo) and Leotar.[19] In pre-dawn raids, SFOR French, Polish, Scandinavian and American soldiers secured the sites and immediately fortified them against anticipated resistance.[20]

At Hill 619, U.S. Engineers operating Armored Combat Excavators (M-9 ACEs) constructed protective berms for the troops, and cleared fields of fire, while other engineers emplaced a triple-standard concertina barrier around the site.[21] At Hill 562, 200 Bosnian-Serb protesters staged a 15-hour confrontation in which the protesters hurled rocks and attacked with clubs, damaging several vehicles.[22]

SFOR Seizure of the SRT Tower at Hill 619.

Physical Destruction is easily understood when applied as one of five elements of C^2W in combat operations. However, the emphasis of C^2W during MOOTW shifts away from the warfighting orientation to take in the broader, and often political, considerations associated with interacting with a variety of actors in the Global Information Environment (GIE).[23] The accepted Joint definition of C^2W specifies that C^2W is "an application of Information Warfare in military operations."[24] Information warfare covers the range of actions taken during conflict or crisis to achieve information superiority over an adversary. Although the term *warfare* may seem to imply that IW applies only to combat operations, in fact, IW *capabilities* are employed in MOOTW to bring about the desired responses from several audiences to include the political and military leadership of the former warring factions, the populace, and other actors.[25] The peace operations force employs its IW capabilities "to preserve the peace, deter escalation of a conflict, and prepare the battlefield so that if a crisis escalated to conflict, the U.S. military can effectively employ (offensive IW) capabilities in a wartime scenario."[26] Following the principle of restraint, and applying IW capabilities selectively, physical destruction operations remain a viable option in peace operations intended to achieve information and situation dominance.

Endnotes:

[1] Maj. Gen. David L. Grange, USA, and Col. James A. Kelley, USA, *"Information Operations for the Ground Commander,"* op. cit., p. 9.

[2] Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, *Concept for Information Operations,* **TRADOC Pamphlet 525-69,** Fort Monroe, VA, 1 August 1995, p. 9.

[3] Les Aspin, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress,* Washington, DC, USGPO, January 1994, p. 244.

[4] Headqaurters, Dept. of the Army, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations,* **Field Manual 100-7,** Washington, DC: USGPO, 31 May 1995, p. 8-14.

[5] Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Peace Operations,* **Field Manual 100-23,** Washington, DC: USGPO, 30 December 1994, p. 17.

[6] Ibid., pp. v and 17.

[7] Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Information Operations,* op. cit., p. 3-5.

[8] Struble, Dan, Lt. Cdr., USNR, *"What Is Command and Control Warfare?,"* **Naval War College Review**, Summer 1995, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, p. 91.

[9] Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Information Operations,* **FM 100-6,** op. cit., p. 3-5.

[10] See Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report, *Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Task Force Eagle Initial Impressions,* (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), Fort Leavenworth ,KS: CALL, May 1996, p. 61.

[11] Larry K. Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience,* Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1998), p. 23.

[12] Lawrence E Caspar, Irving L. Halter, Earl W. Powers, Paul J. Selva, Thomas W. Steffens, and T. Lamar Willis, *"Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Security Strategy for the Next Century,"* **Joint Forces Quarterly,** Autumn 1996, No. 13, p. 85.

[13] Associated Press, *"NATO Pulls Plug on Serb Telecast,"* **The Kansas City Star,** October 19, 1997, p. A14.

[14] Pascale Combelles Siegel, *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations,* Command and Control Research Program, National Defense University, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1998, pp. 160 and 161.

[15] See Tracy Wilkinson, *"Trying to Extract War from Journalism,"* **Los Angeles Times,** Sunday, October 26, 1997, p. 12A.

[16] See Center for Army Lessons Learned, *B/H CAAT Elections, Initial Impressions Report,* (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, March 1998, p. 83.

[17] Larry K. Wentz, *IFOR C⁴ISR Experiences,* National Defense University, Command and Control Research Program, op. cit., 1998, p. 5.

[18] Philip Shenon, *"U.S. and Allies Plan to Curb Bosnian Propaganda,"* **The New York Times,** 24 April 1998.

[19] William B. Buchanan, *U.S. European Command Support of Operation JOINT GUARD (21 December 1996 - 20 December 1997),* (Unclassified, Distribution Limited), Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA Paper P-3389, 1998, p. IV-15.

[20] Dennis Steele, *"Hill 562: Boots in the Mud,"* **Army,** Vol. 48, No. 1, January 1998, pp. 39-41.

[21] See SGT Jerry Parisellad, *"Broadcasts of Violence Stop with SFOR Help,"* 362d Military Public Affairs Detachment, Task Force Eagle *Talon*, Vol. 3, No. 40, October 10, 1997, Eagle Base, Tuzla Bosnia.

[22] Dennis Steele, op. cit. p. 41.

[23] Ibid., p. 4-3.

[24] CJCS, **Joint Publication 3-13.1,** *Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare,* op. cit., p. v.

[25] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,* **Field Manual 34-1,** Washington, DC: USGPO, 27 September 1994, p. 7-4.

[26] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Information Warfare - A Strategy for Peace…The Decisive Edge in War,* Washington, DC: USGPO, 1996, p. 13.